Who Benefits from Targeted Property Tax Relief: Evidence from Virginia Elections? Jeremy G. Moulton, Bennie D. Waller and Scott A. Wentland. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 2018, 37:2, 240-264.
Dynamic Spatial Externalities and Real Estate Liquidity, Ray Brastow, Bennie D. Waller and Scott Wentland. Journal of Real Estate Research, forthcoming.
Connotation and Textual Analysis in Real Estate Listings. Kimberly Goodwin, Bennie D. Waller and Shelton H. Weeks. Journal of Housing Research, forthcoming.
The Impact of Historical Rehabilitative Tax Credits on the Marketing Outcomes of Neighboring Properties.
Geoffrey K. Turnbull, Bennie D. Waller, Walter Witschey and Velma Zahirovic-Herbert.
This study examines the impact of the proximity of properties that have been salvaged through the use of historical rehabilitative tax credits (RTC). More specifically, this study examines the marketing outcomes of neighboring properties relative to RTC properties that have been renovated in terms of selling price, liquidity and probability of sale. Preliminary results suggest that properties in near proximity to RTC properties sell for nearly a 6% price premium but do remain on the market slightly longer. Results also suggest that as the number of RTC properties increase within a two-mile proximity significantly increases the probability of a successful transaction (i.e. increased probability of sale).
Commission Splits in Real Estate Transactions: An Agency Problem? Xun Bian, Bennie D. Waller and Abdullah Yavas. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 2015, 1-23..
We examine the commission splits between listing and selling agents in real estate transactions by constructing a theoretical model to show that agency problems arise when a listing agent attempts to maximize his or her payoff when setting the commission split. Empirical results indicate that commission splits offered are lower for properties with higher listing prices, quick sales, and are higher for overpriced properties. In addition, agent-owned properties pay higher commission splits.
How Many Listings Are Too Many? Agent Listing Inventory and Sales Performance. Xun Bian, Geoffrey K. Turnbull, Bennie D. Waller and Scott Wentland. Journal of Housing Economics, forthcoming, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhe.2015.04.002
This paper examines how agent listing inventory affects the marketing outcomes of individual client properties. The results show that an increase of agent inventory by nine additional listings increases time on market by 14%. A richer inventory measure taking into account the relative location of inventory yields a 26% effect on time on market. The results indicate that agent incentives to secure additional contracts diverts selling effort from existing inventory, resulting in longer time on market for all properties.
The Role of Transaction Costs in Impeding Market Exchange in Real Estate.
Xun Bian, Bennie D. Waller and Scott A. Wentland. Journal of Housing Research, 2016, 25.2: 115-135.
We examine the role transaction costs play, particularly the costs related to search and bargaining, in impeding or delaying real estate market transactions. In a theoretical model, we show that agents’ incentives are influenced by transaction costs in a way that will increase a home’s marketing duration and decrease the probability a home will sell.
Buyers and sellers usually consider closing costs, agent commissions, and a variety of other monetary costs as the primary costs associated with buying/selling a home. Yet, these are not the only costs that stand in the way of buyers and sellers from making a mutually beneficial exchange. It turns out that agent incentives may be an overlooked consideration that has a substantial impact on these transaction outcomes. Specifically, we find that factors contributing to agents’ search (i.e. distance to the listing agent’s office and whether a property is “rural”) and bargaining costs (i.e. whether the property is agent owned) increase a home’s marketing duration and decrease the probability that it will sell. These factors stand as a significant impediment to market exchange in real estate, underscoring the importance of transaction cost as critical starting point for understanding (in)efficiencies in this market.
“Not in My Backyard”:The Effect of Substance Abuse Treatment Centers on Property Values. Claire Reeves LaRoche, Bennie D. Waller and Scott A. Wentland. Journal of Sustainable Real Estate.
Residential treatment centers offer the most intense form of treatment for substance abuse and are often embedded into residential neighborhoods to offer clients a more conventional living experience. The purpose of this paper is to examine the external effect of residential rehab centers on nearby real estate. As addiction treatment centers are planned, a common response of nearby property owners is “not in my backyard” (NIMBY), as residents may perceive recovering (and potentially relapsing) addicts as presenting a heightened crime risk. Empirically, we find that a neighboring treatment center is associated with an 8% reduction in nearby home prices, and that this discount is magnified for treatment centers that specifically treat opiate addiction (as much as 17%).
Seller Over-Pricing and Listing Contract Length: The Effects of Endogenous Listing Contracts on Housing Markets. Randy Anderson, Ray Brastow, Geoffrey Turnbull and Bennie D. Waller, Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 2013, 1-17.
This paper examines how seller pricing decisions influence listing contract length and how these decisions affect price and duration in housing markets. Because list price affects broker effort required to sell the property, brokers respond to seller overpricing by increasing the length of listing contract. At the same time, sellers respond to longer listing contracts by adjusting their pricing strategy. Both affect broker sales effort, hence marketing outcomes. House transaction data from Virginia indicate that greater over-pricing by sellers prompts brokers to pursue longer listing contracts, which subsequently lengthen marketing time but increases selling price. The results reveal a novel transmission mechanism from higher list price (which induces longer contracts) to selling price and liquidity.
Dual Agency Representation: Incentive Conflicts or Efficiencies? Ray Brastow and Bennie D. Waller. Journal of Real Estate Research, 2013, 35:2, 199-222.
This study examines the impact of dual agency on selling price and market liquidity (time on market) relative to the timing of the transaction. Overall properties that sell in a dual agency transaction sell for significantly less and endure longer marketing duration regardless of the timing of the transaction. However, those properties that transact quickly after listing do sell for significantly higher prices appearing to benefit from transactional and informational efficiencies associated with dual agency. Whereas properties that transact near the end of the listing contract sell for significantly less which may be indicative of principal/agent conflict.
Two Sides of Dual Agency: Evidence from Homebuyers and Transactions. Jon Wiley, Bennie D. Waller and Ray Brastow, Journal of Property Research, 2013, 30:1.
This study gains insights to the motivating causes of dual agency transactions in residential real estate by examining two distinct sources of data. The first is evidence from the NAR homebuyers’ survey; the second is MLS data. Results suggest that certain factors contribute to both the likelihood that a buyer will be unrepresented and the incidence of dual agency. The matching of results from the empirical analysis using the MLS transaction data and the NAR homebuyer survey data adds confirmation to our findings. Even as dual agency creates opportunities for efficiency gain, the empirical results have implications for the consequences of homebuyer involvement in the initiation of dual agency, strategic behavior recommendations for brokers as well as the possibility to policy adjustments.
Estimating the Effect of Crime Risk on Property Values and Time on Market: Evidence from Megan’s Law in Virginia. Scott Wentland, Bennie D. Waller and Ray Brastow. Real Estate Economics 2014, 42:1.
This study finds that registered sex offenders residing nearby substantially reduce a home’s price and liquidity. These results are consistent with the notion that residents of central Virginia are aware of and utilize information available in online sex offender registries, made possible by Megan’s Law, to evaluate perceived crime risk when making decisions regarding real estate. We estimate that a sex offender residence located within 0.1 mile lowers a nearby home’s price by approximately 7% and substantially lengthens its time on market by as much as 80%. In addition, we estimate reverse treatments, finding that home prices are not significantly different just prior to a sex offender’s arrival and prices rebound after sex offenders move out, providing evidence that the cross-sectional approach produces properly identified causal estimates.
The Impact of Agent Experience on the Real Estate Transaction. Bennie D. Waller and Ali Jubran, Journal of Housing Research, 2012, 21:1.
This research examines the marketing outcomes of real estate agents who acquire and maintain their real estate salesperson’s license for two years or less (rookie) relative to agents who have been licensed agents for 10 years or more (veteran). The findings show that properties listed by rookie agents will sell for approximately 10% less than those listed by more experienced agents and remain on the market significantly longer than those of more experienced agents. Properties listed by veteran agents sell for approximately 2% more and did so 32% faster.
What You Say Matters: The Impact of Broker Vernacular on Property Marketing Outcomes. Kimberly R. Goodwin, Bennie D. Waller and H. Shelton Weeks. Journal of Housing Research, forthcoming
This study examines the use of broker terminology in MLS listings and its impact on property sales. The results presented in this paper provide evidence that what the broker writes in the MLS listing does matter and provides strong support for the value creation hypothesis. While potential buyers are likely to discount what is perceived to be over-exaggeration and hype, for the most part deliberate and careful construction of the MLS listing can result in positive marketing outcomes (higher selling price, shorter time on market, and higher probability of sale). Furthermore, it is apparent that brokers do convey meaningful information to each other privately through the MLS.
Client Externality of Agents Selling Their Own Properties. Xun Bian, Geoffrey K. Turnbull and Bennie D. Waller. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 2015, 1-26.
This study examines the impact of the marketing outcomes of a client property when in direct competition with their listing agent’s concurrently marketed property. Results indicate that such properties sell for approximately 2% less than client properties listed with agents with no such conflict and endure up to a 70% longer marketing duration.
(What) Do “Productive” Agents Really Deliver for their Clients? Geoffrey K. Turnbull and Bennie D. Waller. Journal of Housing Economics, forthcoming, DOI: 1016/j.jhe.2018.06.005.
This study examines whether certain agents are capable of obtaining superior marketing outcomes for their clients. Results indicate that productive agents (those with a minimum of 2% of market inventory) have no significant impact on selling prices or marketing duration. However, highly productive agents (those with a minimum of 5% of market inventory) do have a significant impact on both selling price and liquidity. Specifically, such agents positively impact selling price by approximately 3% while reducing marketing duration by over 40 percent.